# Procedural

## Case Flaw

#### Plan: the United States federal government should normalize consular financial transactions toward Cuba.

#### A. The plan is the center of this debate. Grammar is key to comprehending and understanding the implications of the plan.

#### B. Violation – the plan is grammatically incorrect. They started the plan text with a lower case t. This is not grammatically correct.

#### C. Vote negative

#### 1. Poor grammar makes the plan impossible to interpret. This makes it a moving target that can shift as needed to avoid negative argumentation. Proper grammar is key to negative preparation and predictability.

#### 2. Poor grammar undermines education centered on what the plan actually does. Interpreting the meaning of grammatically correct text is a key portable skill.

# T

#### A. Interpretation – economic engagement requires expanding bilateral economic relations

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Economic engagement - a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and improve bilateral political relations - is a subject of growing interest in international relations. Most research on economic statecraft emphasizes coercive policies such as economic sanctions. This emphasis on negative forms of economic statecraft is not without justification: the use of economic sanctions is widespread and well documented, and several quantitative studies have shown that adversarial relations between countries tend to correspond to reduced, rather than enhanced, levels of trade (Gowa, 1994; Pollins, 1989). At the same time, however, relatively little is known about how often strategies of economic engagement are deployed: scholars disagree on this point, in part because no database cataloging instances of positive economic statecraft exists (Mastanduno, 2003). Beginning with the classic work of Hirschman (1945), most studies of economic engagement have been limited to the policies of great powers (Mastanduno, 1992; Davis, 1999; Skalnes, 2000; Papayoanou & Kastner, 1999/2000; Copeland, 1999/2000; Abdelal & Kirshner, 1999/2000). However, engagement policies adopted by South Korea and one other state examined in this study, Taiwan, demonstrate that engagement is not a strategy limited to the domain of great power politics and that it may be more widespread than previously recognized.

#### This means the plan has to be government-to-government – not private economic engagement

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U.S. Economic Engagement Toward Cuba, Mexico or Venezuela”, National Center for Policy Analysis, 5/15, <http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/Message_to_Debaters_6-7-13.pdf>)

Economic engagement between or among countries can take many forms, but this document will focus on government-to-government engagement through 1) international trade agreements designed to lower barriers to trade; and 2) government foreign aid; next, we will contrast government-to-government economic engagement with private economic engagement through 3) international investment, called foreign direct investment; and 4) remittances and migration by individuals. All of these areas are important with respect to the countries mentioned in the debate resolution; however, when discussing economic engagement by the U.S. federal government, some issues are more important with respect to some countries than to others.

#### ‘Its’ is a possessive pronoun showing ownership

**Glossary of English Grammar Terms, 2005**

(http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)

Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to show possession or ownership. EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)

#### B. Violation – the plan lifts a barrier, that’s not an economic engagement or an increase of engagement.

#### C. Voting issue –

#### 1. Limits – a government limit is the only way to keep the topic manageable – otherwise they could use any 3rd party intermediary, lift barriers to private engagement, or target civil society – it makes topic preparation impossible

#### 2. Ground – formal governmental channels are key to predictable relations disads and counterplans that test ‘engagement’

# K

#### Security driven economic engagement with Latin America authorizes international violence while criminalizing dissent – the 1AC exhibits a discourse of security that provides the rationale for global domination.

Figueredo 7 [Darío Salinas, Professor in the Graduate Program in Social Sciences at the Universidad Iberoamericana, Mexico City, specialist in Latin American Studies at the CONACYT National System of Researchers, Latin American Perspectives, Issue 152, Vol. 34 No. 1, January, “Hegemony in the Coordinates of U.S. Policy: Implications for Latin America,” Translated by Marlene Medrano, p. 95-98]

The mobilization of an external threat, real or fictitious, and the belief in its intrinsic superiority have historically been important aspects of the discourse of U.S. policy, from the notion of the “savage” Native Americans to the Monroe Doctrine and the postulates of Manifest Destiny to the Huntingtonian elaboration that, by stressing cultural differences, suggests the capacity to harbor in its historical mission the germ of a “superior culture.”¶ After 1989, U.S. hegemony, in its search for a redefinition of the enemy, found in terrorism the threat it required to further its policy. The construction of this threat has not been free of inaccuracies and exaggerations. The most blatant example is that of the “weapons of mass destruction” supposedly in the hands of the deposed Baghdad regime, which, according to Washington, represented a real threat to U.S. security but which turned out to exist only in the political laboratory of the presidential team.¶ The new geostrategic order is overwhelmingly unilateral from the point of view of the political-military, financial, and technological power of the United States. The emergent polarities are fragmented and barely sketch a relative economic and commercial hierarchy, especially with regard to China, Japan, and Germany. At the same time, various indicators suggest a decline in the U.S. economy. The dynamic of these changes has important consequences for the conceptualization of the security issue.¶ During the cold war, “security” meant the traditional “state security.” It consisted of the perception of threats superimposed on the identification of internal conflicts that were treated as “subversive threats” supported from outside. Schematically, this was the general logic of the hegemonic notion of security that involved the “containment of communism” as an ideology. A political framework referred to as “national security doctrine” served as a model for the conduct of the majority of Latin American governments. The hypothesis of “civil war,” which gave rise to the “fight against subversion,” justified the installation or survival of dictatorships.¶ Recently, others attempting to identify structural causes for the conflicts that threaten security have revised this conceptualization. The context for this redefinition is globalization and its implication of interdependence. It is in this context that we can situate terrorism as a “global threat” articulated as a component of a security policy.¶ Finally, the transition to democracy has not resulted in a substantial restructuring of the armed forces. Despite the beneficent dimensions of the political changes in terms of human rights and a democratic rearrangement of the civil-military relationship (Tulchin, 2002), there is no indication of a significant change in the doctrinal framework that guided the actions of the armed forces up to the 1980s. Although there is no homogeneity within military institutions, a conceptual and doctrinal framework is maintained as a general rule. This is an advantage for the new security strategy connected with the fight against terrorism, given that its conception continues to be part of its capacity to control the conduct of others—in other words, to orchestrate its hegemony.¶ FREE TRADE AND SECURITY¶ The post–cold-war period has been characterized by the indisputable dominance of financial capital in the development of the global economy. The free circulation of unrestricted capital constitutes the motor of the model. The globalization of markets involves privatization and deregulation of the international financial system on a primarily speculative basis. The movement of international capital has been freed from the variables of the economy whose operation remained largely beyond the control of the national authorities in charge of economic policy, variables that Treasury secretaries often refer to in terms of a “difficult environment.” The proposal to transform the Latin American region into a free-trade zone is a reflection of this climate that, since 1989 and especially since the Washington Consensus, has been deployed as the ideology of neoliberalism and then as a policy converted into action (Cademartori, 2004).¶ In fact, U.S. conceptions of security and economic-commercial policy constitute an integrated geostrategic whole; the expansion of global commerce is part of the security strategy of the United States (Salinas, 2002). The project is aimed at standardizing the development of the world in terms of criteria that favor the economic-political configuration of the principal world power (Chossudovsky, 2002). Proposals of integration are not related exclusively to commercial issues. The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which should not be considered abandoned, and other free-trade treaties should be considered geopolitical mechanisms for developing a large-scale project of domination. These mechanisms range from the strictly economic to those concerning labor legislation, state reform, laws concerning intellectual property, the environment, natural and energy resources, knowledge, and culture. The free-trade treaties signed so far, Chile’s among them, endorse the totalizing character intended by Washington and Wall Street (Weintraub and Prado, 2005).¶ It is exactly from this angle that the core of this geostrategic conception can be appraised. Its most acute expression was in the formulation of the concept of the “preventive war,” which in the case of Iraq was carried out at the margins of international legality, confirming the unilateralism that is fundamental to decision making in the new geostrategic order.¶ Antiterrorist policy operates as a coercive force that has an impact on regimes whose margins of self-determination are most precarious. The comprehensive treatment of these challenges is expressed in the context of the fragmentation of Latin American foreign policy in the face of the pragmatic U.S. prioritization of drug trafficking, terrorism, and migration.¶ Since 9/11 the United States has attempted to implement its national security policy without much concern for the establishment of agreements. This course of action was ratified both in the Conference on Hemispheric Security in 2003 and in the meeting of secretaries of defense in 2004. Lack of concordance in the treatment of an agenda shared with the United States necessarily turns into a sounding board for a social and political imbalance that disturbs more than the surface of diplomacy. This may be responsible for the strong social pressure to reconsider military spending in the countries of Latin America given their serious deficiencies with regard to social welfare, stability, and security. In the face of this deficit, the significance of military spending as a percentage of the global product since 2001 cannot be overlooked (IISS, 2004).¶ For Latin America, a security setting excluding the United States would be unthinkable. It is appropriate, then, to identify some complications associated with this problem.¶ 1. If the principle of dissuasion no longer seems useful in the struggle against terrorism, it is clear that, despite the prioritization of military force, a policy of alliance is required. In this sense, Latin America is an essential area for the United States because of the importance of its “great southern border.” The historical influence of the United States in the area, beyond its actual strategic supremacy and the agreements already subscribed to, is the best breeding ground for a campaign in favor of validation of the concept of security embodied in the policy of “preventive war.” The demand for collaboration stems from its imperative character, which does not admit different views because those who are not friends are enemies.¶ 2. Multilateralism has lost its force, and its political-diplomatic tools have been debilitated. Although there is no concerted regional capacity to avoid the imposition of unilateralism, countertrends and doubts are arising that release new forms of interaction and collaboration, primarily in the Andes and South America (Rojas, 2003).¶ 3. The sovereignty of the other loses its legitimacy if there is a presumption in the North that under its protection terrorism is being covered up or supported or if there is suspicion concerning the construction of weapons of mass destruction. From this perspective, one of the principal dangers for the security of Latin America stems not from foreign armies or from guerrillas but from criminal organizations. The danger of this perspective is the possibility of criminalizing the social struggle that has been unleashed in the region.¶ 4. The limits of the policy have opened a space for the absolutization of “hard power”—in other words, military force—in the new model and the antiterrorist struggle. From a Latin American viewpoint, security requires a multidimensional reading that transcends the view entailed by that struggle.¶ The significance for U.S. policy assumed by the struggle against terrorism as a “war of global reach” or a “global enterprise of uncertain duration” is inseparable from the previous points (NSC, 2002). These statements are translated into the identification of threats or zones of threat in Latin America as follows:¶ 1. The “triple border” of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, which has long been a path for unregulated trade on a grand scale—in other words, for contraband of all types. Similar cases include the Tabatinga-Leticia corridor on the Brazilian border with Colombia, the Lake Agrio zone between Ecuador and Colombia, and the Darien Jungle.¶ 2. The current government of Venezuela, because of its alleged support of the Colombian guerrillas and for setting a bad political example for the region as a whole. Its economic and political initiatives potentially constitute expressions of a counter-balance to hegemonic politics, which may explain the intrusive and destabilizing harassment to which it is subject.¶ 3. The Cuban government, for its alleged support of international terrorism and the meaning of its politics.¶ 4. “Latin American terrorist organizations,” among them the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army in addition to drug traffickers and paramilitaries. This point implicates Colombia and its neighboring countries, along with the Caribbean basin, as an extraordinarily significant area for U.S. security policy. The U.S. resources destined for Plan Colombia and the Andean Regional Initiative and a sordid struggle for the drug market, added to the climate of war and violence, reflect a situation with the capacity to produce dynamics that unbalance the strategic perspective of regional stability.

#### Security politics authorizes limitless global destruction.

Der Derian 98 (James, Professor of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts, On Security, Ed. Lipschutz, p. 24-25)

No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of "security." In its name, peoples have alienated their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, sovereign states, all to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature--as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign states. In its name, weapons of mass destruction have been developed which have transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. And, less often noted in international relations, in its name billions have been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has been furthered and intellectual dissent muted. We have inherited an ontotheology of security, that is, an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified." Continues... [7](http://libcat1.cc.emory.edu:32888/20050307122932441313c0%3Dwww.ciaonet.org%3A80/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html#note7) In this case, Walt cites IR scholar Robert Keohane on the hazards of "reflectivism," to warn off anyone who by inclination or error might wander into the foreign camp: "As Robert Keohane has noted, until these writers `have delineated . . . a research program and shown . . . that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field.' " [8](http://libcat1.cc.emory.edu:32888/20050307122932441313c0%3Dwww.ciaonet.org%3A80/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html#note8) By the end of the essay, one is left with the suspicion that the rapid changes in world politics have triggered a "security crisis" in security studies that requires extensive theoretical damage control. What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but in recognition of the world as it is, other than us ? What might such a dialogue sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present, to reinterpret--and possibly construct through the reinterpretation--a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities. The steps I take here in this direction are tentative and preliminary. I first undertake a brief history of the concept itself. Second, I present the "originary" form of security that has so dominated our conception of international relations, the Hobbesian episteme of realism. Third, I consider the impact of two major challenges to the Hobbesian episteme, that of Marx and Nietzsche. And finally, I suggest that Baudrillard provides the best, if most nullifying, analysis of security in late modernity. In short, I retell the story of realism as an historic encounter of fear and danger with power and order that produced four realist forms of security: epistemic, social, interpretive, and hyperreal. To preempt a predictable criticism, I wish to make it clear that I am not in search of an "alternative security." An easy defense is to invoke Heidegger, who declared that "questioning is the piety of thought." Foucault, however, gives the more powerful reason for a genealogy of security: I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that's the reason why I don't accept the word alternative. My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. The hope is that in the interpretation of the most pressing dangers of late modernity we might be able to construct a form of security based on the appreciation and articulation rather than the normalization or extirpation of difference. Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness.

#### Reject the Aff’s security discourse – abandoning the attempt to eradicate insecurity is a prerequisite to meaningful political engagement.

Neocleous 8 [Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University, Critique of Security, p. 185-186]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether – to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain ‘this is an insecure world’ and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security.¶ This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end – as the political end – constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible – that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve ‘security’, despite the fact that we are never quite told – never could be told – what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,141 dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more ‘sectors’ to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives.¶ Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that’s left behind? But I’m inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole.142 The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up re-affirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths.¶ For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding ‘more security’ (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn’t damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that ‘security’ helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ‘insecurities’ that come with being human; it requires accepting that ‘securitizing’ an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.143

# Case

#### No chance of terror attack---too tough to execute

John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart 12, Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute AND Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle, "The Terrorism Delusion," Summer, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1, politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller//absisfin.pdf

In 2009, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a lengthy report on protecting the homeland. Key to achieving such an objective should be a careful assessment of the character, capacities, and desires of potential terrorists targeting that homeland. Although the report contains a section dealing with what its authors call “the nature of the terrorist adversary,” the section devotes only two sentences to assessing that nature: “The number and high profile of international and domestic terrorist attacks and disrupted plots during the last two decades underscore the determination and persistence of terrorist organizations. Terrorists have proven to be relentless, patient, opportunistic, and flexible, learning from experience and modifying tactics and targets to exploit perceived vulnerabilities and avoid observed strengths.”8¶ This description may apply to some terrorists somewhere, including at least a few of those involved in the September 11 attacks. Yet, it scarcely describes the vast majority of those individuals picked up on terrorism charges in the United States since those attacks. The inability of the DHS to consider this fact even parenthetically in its fleeting discussion is not only amazing but perhaps delusional in its single-minded preoccupation with the extreme.¶ In sharp contrast, the authors of the case studies, with remarkably few exceptions, describe their subjects with such words as incompetent, ineffective, unintelligent, idiotic, ignorant, inadequate, unorganized, misguided, muddled, amateurish, dopey, unrealistic, moronic, irrational, and foolish.9 And in nearly all of the cases where an operative from the police or from the Federal Bureau of Investigation was at work (almost half of the total), the most appropriate descriptor would be “gullible.”¶ In all, as Shikha Dalmia has put it, would-be terrorists need to be “radicalized enough to die for their cause; Westernized enough to move around without raising red flags; ingenious enough to exploit loopholes in the security apparatus; meticulous enough to attend to the myriad logistical details that could torpedo the operation; self-sufficient enough to make all the preparations without enlisting outsiders who might give them away; disciplined enough to maintain complete secrecy; and—above all—psychologically tough enough to keep functioning at a high level without cracking in the face of their own impending death.”10 The case studies examined in this article certainly do not abound with people with such characteristics. ¶ In the eleven years since the September 11 attacks, no terrorist has been able to detonate even a primitive bomb in the United States, and except for the four explosions in the London transportation system in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. Indeed, the only method by which Islamist terrorists have managed to kill anyone in the United States since September 11 has been with gunfire—inflicting a total of perhaps sixteen deaths over the period (cases 4, 26, 32).11 This limited capacity is impressive because, at one time, small-scale terrorists in the United States were quite successful in setting off bombs. Noting that the scale of the September 11 attacks has “tended to obliterate America’s memory of pre-9/11 terrorism,” Brian Jenkins reminds us (and we clearly do need reminding) that the 1970s witnessed sixty to seventy terrorist incidents, mostly bombings, on U.S. soil every year.12¶ The situation seems scarcely different in Europe and other Western locales. Michael Kenney, who has interviewed dozens of government officials and intelligence agents and analyzed court documents, has found that, in sharp contrast with the boilerplate characterizations favored by the DHS and with the imperatives listed by Dalmia, Islamist militants in those locations are operationally unsophisticated, short on know-how, prone to making mistakes, poor at planning, and limited in their capacity to learn.13 Another study documents the difficulties of network coordination that continually threaten the terrorists’ operational unity, trust, cohesion, and ability to act collectively.14¶ In addition, although some of the plotters in the cases targeting the United States harbored visions of toppling large buildings, destroying airports, setting off dirty bombs, or bringing down the Brooklyn Bridge (cases 2, 8, 12, 19, 23, 30, 42), all were nothing more than wild fantasies, far beyond the plotters’ capacities however much they may have been encouraged in some instances by FBI operatives. Indeed, in many of the cases, target selection is effectively a random process, lacking guile and careful planning. Often, it seems, targets have been chosen almost capriciously and simply for their convenience. For example, a would-be bomber targeted a mall in Rockford, Illinois, because it was nearby (case 21). Terrorist plotters in Los Angeles in 2005 drew up a list of targets that were all within a 20-mile radius of their shared apartment, some of which did not even exist (case 15). In Norway, a neo-Nazi terrorist on his way to bomb a synagogue took a tram going the wrong way and dynamited a mosque instead.15

#### Terrorism is not located in one particular country or group – its a consequence of the new global order, which creates constant internal violence. Their supposed solution plays into the mindset that justifies terrorist acts.

Baudrillard in 03 (Jean, October, “The Mind of Terrorism” 2003)

All the speeches and commentaries made since September 11 betray a gigantic post-traumatic abreaction both to the event itself and to the fascination that it exerts. The moral condemnation anti the sacred union against terrorism are directly proportional to the prodigious jubilation felt at having seen this global superpower destroyed, because it was this insufferable superpower that gave rise both to the violence now spreading throughout the world and to the terrorist imagination that (without our knowing it) dwells within us all.¶ That the entire world without exception had dreamed of this event, that nobody could help but dream the destruction of so powerful a hegemon-this fact is unacceptable to the moral conscience of the West, and yet it is a fact nonetheless, a fact that resists the emotional violence of all the rhetoric conspiring to erase it.¶ In the end, it was they who did it but we who wished it. If we do not take this fact into account, the vent loses all symbolic dimension; it becomes s a purely arbitrary act, the murderous phantasmagoria of a few fanatics that we need only repress. But we know well that such is not tie case. Without our profound complicity the event would not have reverberated so forcefully, and in their strategic symbolism the terrorists knew they could count on this unconfessable complicity.¶ It goes well beyond the hatred that the desolate and the exploited-those who ended up on the wrong side of the new world order-feel toward the dominant global power. This malicious desire resides n the hearts of even those who've shared in the spoils. The allergy to absolute order, to absolute power, is universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center were, precisely because of their ideaticality, the perfect incarnation of this absolute order.¶ Countless disaster films have borne witness to these fantasies, and the universal appeal of the images shows just how close the fantasies always are to being acted out: the closer the entire system gets to perfection or to omnipotence, the stronger the urge to destroy it grows.¶ When the world has been so thoroughly monopolized, when power has been so formidably consolidated by the technocratic machine and the dogma of globalization, what means of turning the tables remains besides terrorism? In dealing all the cards to itself, the system forced the Other to change the rules of the game. And the new rules are ferocious, because the game is ferocious. Terrorism is the act that restores an irreducible singularity to the heart of a generalized system of exchange. All those singularities (species, individuals, cultures) that have been sacrificed to the interests of a global system of commerce avenge themselves by turning the tables with terrorism.¶ Terror against terror-this is no longer an ideological notion. We have gone well beyond ideology and politics, The energy that nourishes terror, no ideology, no cause, not even an Islamic one, can explain. The terrorists are not aiming simply to transform the world. Like the heretics of previous times, they aim to radicalize the world through sacrifice, whereas the system aims to convert: it into money through force.¶ Terrorists, like viruses, are everywhere. There is no longer a boundary that can hem terrorism in; it is at the heart of the very culture it's fighting with, and the visible fracture (and the hatred) that pits the exploited and underdeveloped nations of the world against the West masks the dominant system's internal fractures. It is as if every means of domination secreted its own antidote. Against this almost automatic from of resistance to its power, the system can do nothing. Terrorism is the shock wave of this silent resistance.¶ It is a mistake, then, to characterize this as a clash of civilizations or of religions. It goes well beyond Islam aria' America, on which one aright be tempted to concentrate in order to create the illusion of a confrontation resolvable by force. There is a fundamental antagonism at work. but it transcends the phantom of America (which is perhaps the epicenter though not the incarnation of globalization) as well as the phantom of Islam (which likewise is not the incarnation of terrorism). This is the clash of triumphant globalization at war with itself. In this sense, it is accurate to speak of this as a world war-no: the third but the fourth-and the only one that is truly global, since what's at stake is globalization itself. The first put an end to European supremacy and to the era of colonialism; the second put an end to Nazism; and the third to Communism. Each one brought us progressively closer to the single world order of today, which is now nearing its end, everywhere opposed, everywhere grappling with hostile forces. This is a war of fractal complexity, waged worldwide against rebellious singularities that, in the manner of antibodies, mount a resistance in every cell. These confrontations are so imperceptible that it is occasionally necessary to resuscitate the idea of war by staging spectacular scenes such as those in the Persian Gulf and now in Afghanistan. But World War IV happens elsewhere too. **It haunts all expressions of world order, all forms of hegemonic domination**-if Islam were dominating the world, terrorism would rise up against Islam. **The globe itself is resistant to globalization**.¶ Terrorism is immoral. The occurrence at the World Trade Center, this symbolic act of defiance, is immoral, but it was in response to globalization, which is itself immoral. We are therefore immoral ourselves, so if we hope to understand anything we will need to get beyond Good and Evil. The crucial point lies in precisely the opposite direction from the Enlightenment philosophy of Good and Evil. We naively believe in the progress of Good, that its ascendance in all domains (science, technology, democracy, human rights) corresponds to the defeat of Evil. No one seems to have understood that Good and Evil increase in power at the same time -and in the same way. The triumph of one does not result in the obliteration of the ether; to the contrary. We tend to regard Evil, metaphysically, as an accidental smudge, but this axiom is illusory. Good does not reduce Evil, or vice versa; they are at once irreducible, the one and the other, and inextricably linked. In the end, **Good cannot vanquish Evil except by denying to be Good, since, in monopolizing global power, it entails a backfire of proportional violence.**¶ **In the traditional universe, there remained a balance of Good and Evil**, a dialectical relationship that guaranteed, for better or worse, the tension and equilibrium of the moral universe. This balance was lost as soon as there was a total extrapolation of Good-the hegemony of the positive over every form of negativity. From that moment, **the equilibrium was broken, and Evil returned to an invisible autonomy, increasing exponentially**.¶ Relatively speaking, this is a bit like what happened to the political order after Communism disappeared and neoliberal forces triumphed worldwide. It was then **that a phantom enemy arose, percolating throughout the planet, rising up through all the cracks in power**. Islam. But Islam. is merely the crystallized form of this antagonism. The antagonism is everywhere, and it is in each of us. Hence, terror against terror. But it is asymmetrical terror, and it is this asymmetry that leaves the absolute global power disarmed. It can do nothing but strike at its own rationale for the balance of power, without being able to compete on the playing field of symbolic defiance and of death, having deleted that playing field from its own culture.¶ Until now, this integrating power had succeeded in absorbing and reabsorbing every attack, every negativity, and in doing so created a thoroughly hopeless situation (not only for the wretched o' the earth but also for the privileged and well-to-do in their radical comfort). But the terrorists have started using their own deaths offensively and effectively, based on a strategic intuition, a sense of their adversary's immense fragility, of the system's quasi-perfection, of the explosion that would erupt at the slightest spark. They succeeded in turning their deaths into an ultimate weapon against a system devoted to the ideal of zero losses. **Any system of zero losses is a zero-sum game. And all methods of deterrence and destruction can do nothing against an enemy who has already turned his death into a counteroffensive weapon.** (" Who cares about the American bombing! Our men are as eager to die as the Americans are eager to live!") Thus the imbalance of more than 3,000 deaths inflicted in one fell swoop against a system of zero losses. Here, everything depends upon death, not only upon the brutal irruption of death live and in real time but upon the irruption of a death much more than real: a symbolic and sacrificial death-which is to say, the absolute, ultimate, unappealable event.

### Economy Debate

#### Countries can’t start wars when their economies decline—only growth triggers conflict.

**Bennett and Nordstrom 2k** (Department of Political Science Professors @ Penn state U, D. Scott and Timothy, “Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic problems in Enduring Rivalries” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Feb., p33-61)

Alternative relationships between domestic economic performance and international conflict also have been proposed, perhaps most importantly by Blainey (1973, 74). Blainey offers the alternative hypothesis about economics and war that economically challenged countries are more likely to be the target of aggressive military acts than their initiator (1973, 86). Faced with a poor target in a bad economic situation, who is faced with an unhappy populace and possibly limited resources, potential conflict initiators are likely to see opportunity. The argument also parallels the historical notion that **leaders would only go to war when their coffers were full—in bad times, leaders may simply not be able to afford to go to conflict**. Blainey’s argument appears to pose a challenge to diversionary conflict theory in its emphasis on what is the most likely direction of conflict. Note, however, that its prediction (weak states become targets) differs from a strategic application of diversionary conflict theory.

#### Economic growth is unsustainable – collapse now allows for ecological sustainability and prevents extinction

Barry, 8

(Glen Barry is the President and Founder of Ecological Internet, Ph.D. in Land Resources from U- Wisconsin-Madison, “Economic Collapse And Global Ecology”, http://www.countercurrents.org/barry140108.htm)

Given widespread failure to pursue policies sufficient to reverse deterioration of the biosphere and avoid ecological collapse, the best we can hope for may be that the growth-based **economic system crashes sooner rather than later**. Humanity and the Earth are faced with an enormous conundrum -- sufficient climate policies enjoy political support only in times of rapid economic growth. Yet this growth is the primary factor driving greenhouse gas emissions and other environmental ills. The growth machine has pushed the planet well beyond its ecological carrying capacity, and unless constrained, **can only lead to human extinction** and an end to complex life. With every economic downturn, like the one now looming in the United States, it becomes more difficult and less likely that policy sufficient to ensure global ecological sustainability will be embraced. This essay explores the possibility that from a biocentric viewpoint of needs for long-term global ecological, economic and social sustainability; *it would be better for the economic collapse to come now rather than later*. Economic growth is a deadly disease upon the Earth, with capitalism as its most virulent strain. Throw-away consumption and explosive population growth are made possible by using up fossil fuels and destroying ecosystems. Holiday shopping numbers are covered by media in the same breath as Arctic ice melt, ignoring their deep connection. Exponential economic growth destroys ecosystems and pushes the biosphere closer to failure. Humanity has proven itself unwilling and unable to address climate change and other environmental threats with necessary haste and ambition. Action on coal, forests, population, renewable energy and emission reductions could be taken now at net benefit to the economy. Yet, the losers -- primarily fossil fuel industries and their bought oligarchy -- successfully resist futures not dependent upon their deadly products. Perpetual economic growth, and necessary climate and other ecological policies, **are fundamentally incompatible**. Global ecological sustainability depends critically upon establishing a steady state economy, whereby production is right-sized to not diminish natural capital. Whole industries like coal and natural forest logging will be eliminated even as new opportunities emerge in solar energy and environmental restoration. This critical transition to both economic and ecological sustainability is simply not happening on any scale. The challenge is how to carry out necessary environmental policies even as economic growth ends and consumption plunges. The natural response is going to be liquidation of even more life-giving ecosystems, and jettisoning of climate policies, to vainly try to maintain high growth and personal consumption. We know that humanity must reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80% over coming decades. How will this and other necessary climate mitigation strategies be maintained during years of economic downturns, resource wars, reasonable demands for equitable consumption, and frankly, the weather being more pleasant in some places? If efforts to reduce emissions and move to a steady state economy fail; the collapse of ecological, economic and social systems is assured. Bright greens take the continued existence of a habitable Earth with viable, sustainable populations of all species including humans as the ultimate truth and the meaning of life. Whether this is possible in a time of economic collapse is crucially dependent upon whether enough ecosystems and resources remain post collapse to allow humanity to recover and reconstitute sustainable, relocalized societies. It may be better for the Earth and humanity's future that economic collapse comes sooner rather than later, while more ecosystems and opportunities to return to nature's fold exist. Economic collapse will be deeply wrenching -- part Great Depression, part African famine. There will be starvation and civil strife, and a long period of suffering and turmoil. Many will be killed as balance returns to the Earth. Most people have forgotten how to grow food and that their identity is more than what they own. Yet there is some justice, in that those who have lived most lightly upon the land will have an easier time of it, even as those super-consumers living in massive cities finally learn where their food comes from and that ecology is the meaning of life. **Economic collapse now means humanity and the Earth ultimately survive to prosper again**. Human suffering -- already the norm for many, but hitting the currently materially affluent -- is inevitable given the degree to which the planet's carrying capacity has been exceeded. We are a couple decades at most away from societal strife of a much greater magnitude as the Earth's biosphere fails. **Humanity can take the bitter medicine now, and recover** while emerging better for it; **or our total collapse can be a final, fatal death swoon**. A successful revolutionary response to imminent global ecosystem collapse would focus **upon bringing down the Earth's industrial economy now**. As society continues to fail miserably to implement necessary changes to allow creation to continue, maybe the best strategy to achieve global ecological sustainability is economic sabotage to hasten the day. It is more fragile than it looks.

points - which will come first, a switch to sustainable technology, or collapse?" Tainter is not convinced that even new technology will save civilisation in the long run. "I sometimes think of this as a 'faith-based' approach to the future," he says. Even a society reinvigorated by cheap new energy sources will eventually face the problem of diminishing returns once more. Innovation itself might be subject to diminishing returns, or perhaps absolute limits. Studies of the way by Luis Bettencourt of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico, support this idea. His team's work suggests that an ever-faster rate of innovation is required to keep cities growing and prevent stagnation or collapse, and in the long run this cannot be sustainable.

#### No historical connection between economic collapse and conflict

Ferguson 6 – M.A., Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University, Resident faculty member of the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Senior Research Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford University, and a Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University (Niall, “The Next War of the World”, Foreign Affairs, September-October 2006, May 21st 2010)

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

### Failed States

#### No impact to failed states

Patrick, 11

(Stewart M, senior fellow, director – program on international institutions and global governance @ CFR, 4/15/’ “Why Failed States Shouldn’t Be Our Biggest National Security Fear,” http://www.cfr.org/international-peace-and-security/why-failed-states-shouldnt-our-biggest-national-security-fear/p24689)

In truth, while failed states may be worthy of America's attention on humanitarian and development grounds, most of them are irrelevant to U.S. national security. The risks they pose are mainly to their own inhabitants. Sweeping claims to the contrary are not only inaccurate but distracting and unhelpful, providing little guidance to policymakers seeking to prioritize scarce attention and resources.

In 2008, I collaborated with Brookings Institution senior fellow Susan E. Rice, now President Obama's permanent representative to the United Nations, on an index of state weakness in developing countries. The study ranked all 141 developing nations on 20 indicators of state strength, such as the government's ability to provide basic services. More recently, I've examined whether these rankings reveal anything about each nation's role in major global threats: transnational terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international crime and infectious disease.

The findings are startlingly clear. Only a handful of the world's failed states pose security concerns to the United States. Far greater dangers emerge from stronger developing countries that may suffer from corruption and lack of government accountability but come nowhere near qualifying as failed states.

The link between failed states and transnational terrorism, for instance, is tenuous. Al-Qaeda franchises are concentrated in South Asia, North Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia but are markedly absent in most failed states, including in sub-Saharan Africa. Why? From a terrorist's perspective, the notion of finding haven in a failed state is an oxymoron. Al-Qaeda discovered this in the 1990s when seeking a foothold in anarchic Somalia. In intercepted cables, operatives bemoaned the insuperable difficulties of working under chaos, given their need for security and for access to the global financial and communications infrastructure. Al-Qaeda has generally found it easier to maneuver in corrupt but functional states, such as Kenya, where sovereignty provides some protection from outside interdiction.

Pakistan and Yemen became sanctuaries for terrorism not only because they are weak but because their governments lack the will to launch sustained counterterrorism operations against militants whom they value for other purposes. Terrorists also need support from local power brokers and populations. Along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, al-Qaeda finds succor in the Pashtun code of pashtunwali, which requires hospitality to strangers, and in the severe brand of Sunni Islam practiced locally. Likewise in Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has found sympathetic tribal hosts who have long welcomed mujaheddin back from jihadist struggles.

Al-Qaeda has met less success in northern Africa's Sahel region, where a moderate, Sufi version of Islam dominates. But as the organization evolves from a centrally directed network to a diffuse movement with autonomous cells in dozens of countries, it is as likely to find haven in the banlieues of Paris or high-rises of Minneapolis as in remote Pakistani valleys.

What about failed states and weapons of mass destruction? Many U.S. analysts worry that poorly governed countries will pursue nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological weapons; be unable to control existing weapons; or decide to share WMD materials.

These fears are misplaced. With two notable exceptions — North Korea and Pakistan — the world's weakest states pose minimal proliferation risks, since they have limited stocks of fissile or other WMD material and are unlikely to pursue them. Far more threatening are capable countries (say, Iran and Syria) intent on pursuing WMD, corrupt nations (such as Russia) that possess loosely secured nuclear arsenals and poorly policed nations (try Georgia) through which proliferators can smuggle illicit materials or weapons.

When it comes to crime, the story is more complex. Failed states do dominate production of some narcotics: Afghanistan cultivates the lion's share of global opium, and war-torn Colombia rules coca production. The tiny African failed state of Guinea-Bissau has become a transshipment point for cocaine bound for Europe. (At one point, the contraband transiting through the country each month was equal to the nation's gross domestic product.) And Somalia, of course, has seen an explosion of maritime piracy. Yet failed states have little or no connection with other categories of transnational crime, from human trafficking to money laundering, intellectual property theft, cyber-crime or counterfeiting of manufactured goods.

Criminal networks typically prefer operating in functional countries that provide baseline political order as well as opportunities to corrupt authorities. They also accept higher risks to work in nations straddling major commercial routes. Thus narco-trafficking has exploded in Mexico, which has far stronger institutions than many developing nations but borders the United States. South Africa presents its own advantages. It is a country where “the first and the developing worlds exist side by side,” author Misha Glenny writes. “The first world provides good roads, 728 airports . . . the largest cargo port in Africa, and an efficient banking system. . . . The developing world accounts for the low tax revenue, overstretched social services, high levels of corruption throughout the administration, and 7,600 kilometers of land and sea borders that have more holes than a second-hand dartboard.” Weak and failing African states, such as Niger, simply cannot compete.

Nor do failed states pose the greatest threats of pandemic disease. Over the past decade, outbreaks of SARS, avian influenza and swine flu have raised the specter that fast-moving pandemics could kill tens of millions worldwide. Failed states, in this regard, might seem easy incubators of deadly viruses. In fact, recent fast-onset pandemics have bypassed most failed states, which are relatively isolated from the global trade and transportation links needed to spread disease rapidly.

Certainly, the world's weakest states — particularly in sub-Saharan Africa — suffer disproportionately from disease, with infection rates higher than in the rest of the world. But their principal health challenges are endemic diseases with local effects, such as malaria, measles and tuberculosis. While U.S. national security officials and Hollywood screenwriters obsess over the gruesome Ebola and Marburg viruses, outbreaks of these hemorrhagic fevers are rare and self-contained.

I do not counsel complacency. The world's richest nations have a moral obligation to bolster health systems in Africa, as the Obama administration is doing through its Global Health Initiative. And they have a duty to ameliorate the challenges posed by HIV/AIDS, which continues to ravage many of the world's weakest states. But poor performance by developing countries in preventing, detecting and responding to infectious disease is often shaped less by budgetary and infrastructure constraints than by conscious decisions by unaccountable or unresponsive regimes. Such deliberate inaction has occurred not only in the world's weakest states but also in stronger developing countries, even in promising democracies. The list is long. It includes Nigeria's feckless response to a 2003-05 polio epidemic, China's lack of candor about the 2003 SARS outbreak, Indonesia's obstructionist attitude to addressing bird flu in 2008 and South Africa's denial for many years about the causes of HIV/AIDS.

Unfortunately, misperceptions about the dangers of failed states have transformed budgets and bureaucracies. U.S. intelligence agencies are mapping the world's “ungoverned spaces.” The Pentagon has turned its regional Combatant Commands into platforms to head off state failure and address its spillover effects. The new Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review completed by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development depicts fragile and conflict-riddled states as epicenters of terrorism, proliferation, crime and disease.

Yet such preoccupations reflect more hype than analysis. U.S. national security officials would be better served — and would serve all of us better — if they turned their strategic lens toward stronger developing countries, from which transnational threats are more likely to emanate.

### Relations

#### Cuba doesn’t want US economic engagement

Anya Landau French 13, Director of the New America Foundation U.S. – Cuba Policy Initiative, 2/10/13, “Secretary Kerry: Will He or Won't He Take On Cuba?,” http://thehavananote.com/2013/02/secretary\_kerry\_will\_he\_or\_wont\_he\_take\_cuba

And, then there’s the Cuban government. As much as many in the Cuban government (particularly the diplomatic corps) want to reduce tensions with the United States and finally make real progress on long-standing grievances held by both sides, they aren’t desperate for the big thaw. Many U.S. analysts, including in government, speculate that this is because Cuba’s leaders don’t really want to change the relationship, that strife serves their needs better than would the alternative. That could be so, but there’s also a hefty amount of skepticism and pride on the Cuban side, as well. After so many decades and layers of what Cuba calls the U.S. blockade, Cubans are unwilling to have the terms of any ‘surrender’ dictated to them. In fact, they are bound and determined that there will be no surrender. They would argue, what is there to surrender but their government’s very existence, something the leadership obviously isn’t going to put on the table.¶ Many in the Cuban government question whether the U.S. would offer anything that truly matters to Cuba, or honor any commitments made. Arguably, the last deal the U.S. made good on was struck during the Missile Crisis of October 1963, and Cuba wasn’t even at the table for that. It’s a lesser known fact that the United States never fully implemented the 1994/1995 migration accords, which committed both nations to work to prevent migration by irregular means. The U.S. did stop accepting illegal migrants from Cuba found at sea, but it still accepts them when they reach our shores – thus dubbed our ‘wet foot, dry foot’ policy. And with our generous adjustment policy offering a green card after one year, the incentive to make the illegal trip remains largely in place.

### Free Trade

Trade interdependence causes war

George Friedman, founder and chairman of Stratfor, and Meredith Friedman, The Future of War, 1996, p. 7­9

The argument that interdependence gives rise to peace is flawed in theory as well as in practice. Conflicts arise from friction, particularly friction involving the fundamental interests of different nations. The less interdependence there is, the fewer the areas of serious friction. The more interdependence there is, the greater the areas of friction, and, therefore, the greater the potential for conflict. Two widely separated nations that trade little with each other are unlikely to go to war—Brazil is unlikely to fight Madagascar precisely because they have so little to do with each other. France and Germany, on the other hand, which have engaged in extensive trade and transnational finance, have fought three wars with each other over about seventy years. Interdependence was the root of the conflicts, not the deterrent. There are, of course, cases of interdependence in which one country effectively absorbs the other or in which their interests match so precisely that the two countries simply merge. In other cases, interdependence remains peaceful because the economic, military, and political power of one country is overwhelming and inevitable. In relations between advanced industrialized countries and third-world countries, for example, this sort of asymmetrical relationship can frequently be seen. All such relationships have a quality of unease built into them, particularly when the level of interdependence is great. When one or both nations attempt, intentionally or unintentionally, to shift the balance of power, the result is often tremendous anxiety and, sometimes, real pain. Each side sees the other's actions as an attempt to gain advantage and becomes frightened. In the end, precisely because the level of interdependence is so great, the relationship can, and frequently does, spiral out of control. Consider the seemingly miraculous ability of the United States and Soviet Union to be rivals and yet avoid open warfare. These two powers could forgo extreme measures because they were not interdependent. Neither relied on the other for its economic well-being, and therefore, its social stability. This provided considerable room for maneuvering. Because there were few economic linkages, neither nation felt irresistible pressure to bring the relationship under control; neither felt any time constraint. Had one country been dependent on the other for something as important as oil or long-term investment, there would have been enormous fear of being held hostage economically. Each would have sought to dominate the relationship, and the result would have been catastrophic. In the years before World War I, as a result of European interdependence, control of key national issues fell into the hands of foreign governments. Thus, decisions made in Paris had tremendous impact on Austria, and decisions made in London determined growth rates in the Ruhr. Each government sought to take charge of its own destiny by shifting the pattern of interdependence in its favor. Where economic means proved insufficient, political and military strategies were tried.

Free trade doesn't cause peace

Christopher Layne, Naval Postgraduate School, World Policy Journal, Summer 1998, p. 8-28.

 These arguments notwithstanding, international economic interdependence does not cause peace. In fact, it has very serious adverse security consequences that its proponents either do not understand or will not acknowledge. Economic relations (whether domestic or international) never take place in a vacuum; on the contrary, they occur within a politically defined framework. International economic interdependence requires certain conditions in order to flourish, including a maximum degree of political order and stability. Just as the market cannot function within a state unless the state creates a stable "security" environment in which economic exchange can occur (by protecting property rights and enforcing contracts), the same is true in international relations. Because there is no world government, it falls to the dominant state to create the conditions under which economic interdependence can take hold (by providing security, rules of the game, and a reserve currency, and by acting as the global economy's banker and lender of last resort). Without a dominant power to perform these tasks, economic interdependence does not happen. Indeed, free trade and interdependence have occurred in the modern international system only during the hegemonies of Victorian Britain and postwar America.

### Protectionism

#### Protectionism is a myth

Gerard and Paul, (Leo Gerard, International President of the United Steelworkers (USW) unionand Scott Paul – president of the Alliance for American Manufacturing, “American Protectionism is a Myth,” July 21, 2009,http://www.huffingtonpost.com/scott-paul/american-protectionism-is\_b\_242291.html)

But American protectionism is a myth. If one wishes to point fingers, they should be directed toward Beijing,**Tokyo, Brussels, and Seoul, where mercantilism and subsidies still reign supreme**.¶ This is the untold story of protectionism: the barriers that other governments erect to block American goods and the mercantilist measures they utilize to gain market share in the U.S. These practices range from[China's currency misalignment and massive industrial subsidies](http://www.americanmanufacturing.org/issues/china-cheats/how-china-cheats/)to non-tariff barriers in Korea and Japan. All these impediments have been well documented by U.S. trade officials, but the mere act of identifying these practices is now viewed as protectionism, even though taking action to eliminate them would expand world trade, reduce global imbalances and preserve the free market.¶ The obsession with American protectionism is nothing more than a diversion from the real questions that need to be answered. How do we end global imbalances and achieve a balance between our exports and imports? How do we revitalize our nation's manufacturing sector, which is responsible for a large share of America's innovation and production? How do we begin growing jobs again in this difficult business environment?¶ Congress took a very small step forward in the stimulus package passed in February by requiring some materials used in infrastructure projects to be sourced domestically to the extent permitted by U.S. trade obligations. The value of the materials affected is only a small fraction of the[$4 trillion in two-way trade that crosses the U.S. border annually](http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/historical/gands.txt), but it is providing a much-needed boost to the American manufacturing sector. Contrary to widely held perceptions, this Buy America rule is not a new requirement, nor does it make America a renegade nation.

Buy America has served as an effective jobs generator and a smart economic policy for decades. It applied to materials used in the construction of the interstate highway system in the 1950s. In the midst of a recession during the early 1980s, President Reagan signed legislation that strengthened Buy America requirements. Some sort of domestic sourcing requirement has applied to most major infrastructure expenditures passed by Congress since World War II, so it would have been a surprise if a requirement had not been attached to the stimulus spending.

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